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Abstract

pled with secrecy, is usually achieved by way of
cryptographic functions. Two philosophies undercurrent in modern cryptology are private (shared
or symmetric) key cryptography and public (asymmetric) key cryptography.

Kerberos-type authentication protocols have more
to offer when they are founded upon public key
cryptosystems. In the current paper we argue and
illustrate this point by way of presenting a protocol that implements Kerberos using a recent and
promising public key cryptosystem, which is secure against the adaptatively chosen ciphertext attacks. The flexibility of the solution is highlighted
by extending the protocol to allow the use of one
ticket for multiple services. The issue of hierarchical inter-realm authentication is also considered by
way of two protocols based on the notion of localized and globalized keys respectively. These protocols represents a step towards a family of solutions based on the combination of the advantages
of private key and public key cryptography.
Keywords: Information Security, Authentication,
Upper layer protocols, Cryptography, Network Security, Distributed Systems.

1

In private key cryptosystems the sender and
the receiver share the one same key used to encipher and decipher the message text. Decipherability of a piece of ciphertext implies the authenticity of the text. In public key cryptosystems the
secret key known only to the sender is related to
a public key available to the sender and any other
party. Since the secret key and public key are related, any plaintext enciphered using one key can
only be deciphered using the other key. Extracting the secret key from the corresponding public
key is deemed to be computationally infeasible.
From these two fundamental types of cryptosystems a range of different functionalities can
be established by way of building protocols that
embody one or the other (or both) of these types
of cryptosystems [1]. Due to the complexity and
cost of the task of ensuring a correct and tamperfree implementations [2] of such protocols as an
integrated part of the architecture (eg. ISO /OSI,
Internet) a more common approach has been to
place them in the upper layers of such architectures.

Introduction

Authentication represents an important security functionality in computer networks and distributed systems.
Informally, authentication
refers to the ability of the receiver of a message
to verify that the message truly came from the alleged sender. Authentication, which is often cou-

One authentication system that has received
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approaches of using the de facto standard RSA
cryptosystem [8], we employ the recent and attractive public key cryptosystem of [9] which offers
some inherent advantages over RSA. The cryptosystem of [9] has been shown to be secure against
the strongest type of attacks, namely the adaptatively chosen ciphertext attacks. In addition,
the cryptosystem allows Clients and other participants to share common parameters in a secure
fashion, leading to interesting key compositions.
Such key compositions are virtually impossible to
be achieved using the RSA cryptosystem since the
parameters related to the generation of a secretpublic key pair must be maintained secret by the
owner of the key pair.

considerable attention in the recent past is the
Kerberos authentication service [3, 4, 5], which
is a component within the Project Athena at
MIT [6]. Kerberos adopts the private (shared) key
approach, and is a trusted third-party authentication service developed from the authentication
model of [7]. The Kerberos authentication service
provides a trusted intermediary between a User or
Client that requires services from a Server. It authenticates the User or Client by way of a shared
private key, and it provides a way for the Server
to authenticate the User or Client when it request
the services of the Server.
Due to the use of private key cryptography,
the Kerberos authentication service requires a key
to be shared between the User or Client and the
trusted authorities in the system, namely the Key
Distribution Center (KDC) and the Ticket Granting Server (TGS) [5]. This, however, requires a
great amount of trust to be placed on the im plementation of the trusted authorities, since their
compromise results in possible masquerade by the
attacker of the User or Client whose private key
are stored with these trusted authorities.

In the next section (Section 2) we briefly summarize the Kerberos authentication service (version 5) as described in [5]. We assume the readers
are familiar with the basic constructs and mechanisms of Kerberos, and we direct them to [3, 5]
for more details on its implementation. In Section 3 we present our approach using the public
key cryptosystem of [9]. This is continued in Section 4 by an investigation into the use tickets for
multiple services. The algorithms that implement
our approach are then given in Section 5. As an
afterthought, the flexibility of our approach is further illustrated in Section 6 by inter-realm authentication in a hierarchically organized realms or domains, each managed by a TGS. Section 7 presents
a brief discussion and comparison between our approach and Kerberos, whilst Section 8 briefly discusses the security level achieved by our solution.
The paper is finally closed in Section 9 by some
concluding remarks.

With this in mind, in this paper we investigate an alternative approach based on the use of a
public key cryptosystem, following the footsteps of
Kerberos and offering new functionalities such the
use of multiple-service tickets. A public key approach gains the advantage of requiring less trust
in the implementation of the trusted authorities.
This advantage is derived from the nature of public key cryptosystems which only requires the User
or Client to share the publicly-known key with the
trusted authorities. Hence, the compromise of the
trusted authorities does not lead to the possible
masquerade of the User or Client.

2

Another advantage of this approach is the
ability of the Clients to use their public keys to
perform one-to-one secure communications with
other Clients. This ability is not immediately
present in Kerberos since any two Clients must
first establish a common key via a key-exchange
protocol before they can communicate securely.

Kerberos authentication serVIce

.

In the Kerberos authentication system [3, 5] the
entities that interact with the authentication service are called principals. The term can be used
for Users, Clients or Servers. Commonly, a user
directs a Client (eg. a program) on a machine to
request a service provided by a Server on a remote

Finally, contrary to the common public key
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machine. The Server itself is usually a process
on the remote machine, and different services are
usually taken to be available on differing remote
machines. Kerberos employs two types of credentials to achieve authentications, namely the tickets
of the form

{s, c, addr, timestamp, lifetime, Ks,e}
and the authenticators of the form
1-5- - - - - - -

{c, addr, timestamp}
which is enciphered using a key common to the issuer and the recipient. Here the ticket consists
of the Server and Client identities, followed by
the Client's network address, a unique timestamp,
the lifetime of the ticket and finally by the common key to be shared between the Server and the
Client [3]. In this example, the ticket contains
the key Ks,e shared between the Client c and the
Server s. The Server is trusted to generate such
shared keys and when the ticket is to be given to
a Client c then it must be enciphered using the
Client's key Ke.

Figure 1: Obtaining a service ticket (after [5])
4. TGS

2. KDC
3. Client

-+

-+

5. Client

-+

Server: {Ae}Kc,s' {Te,s}K s

6. Server

-+

Client: {timestamp + l}Kc,s

In step 3 the Client then creates an authenticator Ae to be read only by the TGS (hence enciphered using Ke,tgs) and presents it to the TG~ together with the ticket {Te,tgs}K tgs which the Client
obtained from the KDC.

KDC: c, tgs

On receiving the authenticator and ticketgranting ticket from the Client, the TGS deciphers and authenticates the ticket (step 4). The

Client: {Ke,tgs}K c' {Te,tgs}K tgs
TGS: {Ae} Kc,tgs' {Te,tgs} Ktgs '

Client: {Ke,s}Kc,tgs' {Te,S}K s

In step 2 the KDC generates a session key
K e, t gs that will be shared between the Client and
the TGS. A copy ofthis key is enciphered using the
Client's key Ke to guarantee that the Client can
obtain it securely. The ticket-granting ticket Te,tgs
to be presented to the TGS by the Client already
contains a copy of the session key Ke,tgs' Hence,
both the Client and the TGS can later communicate securely using this session key shared between
them. Note that the ticket is enciphered using the
TGS's private key K tgs known only to the KDC
and the TGS.

The actions of the Kerberos authentication
service following the description of [5] is given in
the following (Figure 1).
-+

-+

In step 1 the Client c requests the Key Distribution Center (KDC) for an initial ticket and
credentials to be presented to the Ticket Granting
Server (TGS).

In brief, the interactions within the authentication service consists of the Client requesting
the Key Distribution Center (KDC) for a ticketgranting ticket to be submitted by the Client to
the Ticket Granting Server (TGS). The TGS then
issues the Client with a service ticket which has a
shorter lifetime compared to the ticket-granting
ticket. The service ticket is then used by the
Client to request the services of the Server which
is mentioned in the ticket. These two stages are
also referred to as the credential-initialization and
client-server authentication protocols respectively
in [10].

1. Client

~~)

S
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For the current usage of the cryptosystem, assume that the secret and public key pairs of the
principals are as follows. The KDC has the pair
(Xkde,Ykde == gX kdc ), the Client has (xe,Ye == gXc),
the TGS has (X tgs , ytgs == gXtgs), while the Server
has (Xs, Y s == gXs). The keys Ykde, Y e, ytgs and Y s
are known to the public as in other systems based
on public key cryptography.

TGS then generates another session key Ke,s to
be shared between the Client c and the Server s.
The TGS also creates a service ticket destined for
the Server. This ticket Te,s contains a copy of the
new session key, and its lifetime is shorter than
the lifetime of the initial ticket Te,tgs' The TGS
knows the private key of every Server s, and ticket
is made exclusively for the eyes of the Server by
enciphering it using Ks. A copy of the session
key Ke,s (hidden by enciphering it using Ke,tgs)
accompanies the ticket to the Client.

Each session secret and public key pair is denoted by (k, K == gk), and their subscripts indicates which principals employ the key pair. Hence,
the pair (ke,tgs, Ke,tgs) is used for interactions between the Client and the TGS. In our case the
tickets to be employed do not contain any keys,
hence their form are:

In step 5, the Client enciphers the authenticator Ae using the session key Ke,s which it will
share with the Server s. This is then sent to the
Server s together with the ticket obtained from the
TGS. The Client may request the Server to prove
its identity which can be achieved by the Server
incrementing the timestamp value by one, and enciphering the result using the session key shared
between the Server and the Client (step 6).

{s, c, addr, timestamp, lifetime}

3.1

Getting an initial ticket

1. Client

3

2. KDC

Public key approach

-+
-+

KDC: c, tgs
Client: Ke,tgs, Ce,tgs

The KDC first generates the session key pair
(ke,tgs, K e,tgs) to be used between the Client
and the TGS.

In this section we propose an approach based on
public key cryptography. Our approach is founded
on the public key cryptosystem of [9], and some of
its constructs that are necessary for the current
discussion will be presented in the following. The
algorithms that implement the cryptosystem are
deferred until Section 5 in order to simplify discussion.

The cryptogram Ce,tgs is the ticket-granting
ticket Te,tgs being enciphered as:

Ce,tgs -= {Te,tgs }Tc,tgs
where

)Xkdc+kc,tgs
r e,tgs =
- (y e ~
.1 tgs

In the public key cryptosystem of [9] a secret
key is is chosen randomly and uniformly from the
integers in [l,p - 1], where the prime p is public
and is used to generate the multiplicative group
GF(p)* of the finite field GF(p). The generator
of this multiplicative group is denoted as 9 and it
is a publicly known value. This usage of 9 and p
is inspired by notable works of [11] and [12]. The
corresponding public key is then produced by using the secret key as the exponent of 9 modulo
p. In the remainder of this paper all exponentiations are assumed to be done over the underlying
groups.

3. Client

-+

TGS: Ae,tgs, Ke,tgs, Ce,tgs,

(1)
S

On receiving the enciphered ticket Ce,tgs together with its accompanying session public
key Ke,tgs the Client computes a Authenticator Ae,tgs:

The authenticator, the received session public
key and enciphered ticket-granting ticket, and
4

the identity of the destination Server s are
then delivered to the TGS.

presented to the Server whenever the Client
requires the service.

The TGS employs the session public key
Kc,tgs to compute its Decryptor Dtgs,c as:

On first being presented with the (enciphered)
service ticket, the Server must compute its
corresponding decrypt or
Ds,c == (ytgs Kc,s)xS

This is then used to recreate the key r c,tgs that
was used by the KDC to encipher the ticket:

The Server is then able to recreate the session
key r C,s as:

r~,t9S == Ac,tgs Dtgs,c

r'C ,s == Ac"s D s c

The resulting key r~,t9S is then used to recover
the ticket Tc,tgs.

to be used to obtain {Tc,sllkc,s}.
6. Server ~ Client: {timestamp + l}r s.c

3.2

Getting a service ticket

If required, the Server may respond to the
Client's request of proving the Server's identity. This can be done by the Server reusing
the key kc,s that was enciphered together with
the service ticket Tc,s. The key is reused to
create rs,c as:

In order to obtain the services of the Server the
Client must obtain a service ticket from the TGS
to be presented to the Server. We continue the
procedure in the following steps.
4. TGS

~

Client: Kc,s, Cc,s
to encipher {timestamp + 1}.

In order to encipher the service ticket Tc,s
the TGS must generate the session key pair
(kc,s, Kc,s) which is used as follows:

The Client can recreate the key rs,c as:

which is then used to recover and check
{timestamp + 1}.

where
r C,s =
-

(y c y.s )Xtgs+kc.s

resulting in the cryptogram Cc,s.

4

The cryptogram Cc,s and the session public
key Kc,s are then delivered to the Client.
5. Client

~

Multiple-Service ticket

It would be convenient if a Client could use one
service-ticket to access several distinct services offered by various Servers. We can do this as will be
shown here.

Server: Ac,s, Kc ,s, Cc,s

As when dealing with the TGS, the Client
must compute the authenticator Ac,s indicating its desire to use the service provided by
the Server:

First, the TGS must be notified by the Client
about the q services S1, S2, •.• ,Sq that the Client
wishes to access. We can repeat the last two steps
(ie. steps 4 and 5) as follows:
M3. Client ~ TGS: Ac,tgs, Kc,tgs, Cc,tgs, m

This authenticator, the received session public key and enciphered service ticket are then

( S1, S2, ••• , Sq)

5

M4. TGS

The Server is then able to recreate the session
key Te ,8 as

Client:

The TGS prepares the service ticket Te,m,
generates the key pair (ke,m, Ke,m) and enciphers the ticket into Ce,m:

Te' m == Ae m Dm e Re 8
,

,

,

,

tI

to be used to decipher the service ticket Ce,m'

Ce,m == {Te,mllke,m}rc,m

5

where

Te ,
m = (Ye Y. Y. ... y. )Xtgs+kc,m
81
82
8q

Algorithms

As described briefly in Section 3, our approach is
based on the public key cryptosystem of [9]. In
this section we provide further notations for the
cryptosystem and present the algorithm for the
encipherment and decipherment of tickets based
on a modified version of the original cryptosystem
of [9]. The algorithms expresses only the encipherment (decipherment) of the plaintext (ciphertext)
tickets, and do not incorporate the steps taken by
the KDC, Client, TGS and the Server. Hence, the
reader is encouraged to read them in conjunction
with the steps provided in Sections 3.2 and 3.1.

The TGS must also computer q number of
selectors R e,S1' R e,S2' ••• ,Re,sq which will be
used by the Client to choose among the q
specified Servers S1, S2, ••• , Sq. These selectors are computed as:

( Y.82 Y.83 ... y.Sq )Xtgs+kc,m
( Y.81 y.83 ... 1':8q )Xtgs+kc,m
(Y.81 Y.S2 ... y.8 q - l )Xtgs+kc,m
The cryptogram Ce,m, the session public key
K e,m and the selectors are then delivered to
the client.

5.1

Notation

The following notation is taken directly from [9].
The cryptosystem of [9] employs a n-bit prime p
(public) and a generator 9 (public) of the multiplicative group G F(p)* of the finite field G F(p).
Here n is a security parameter which is greater
that 512 bits, while the prime p must be chosen
such that p - 1 has a large prime factor. Concatenation of string are denoted using the "II" symbol
and the bit-wise XOR operations of two strings is
symbolized using "EB". The notation W[i ...j] (i ~ j)
is used to indicate the substring obtained by taking the bits of string W from the i-th bit (Wi) to
the j-th bit (Wj).

As in the single-service case, the Client must
compute its authenticator to be delivered to
the Server. Thus,

However, in this multi-service case, the Client
must select the Server from which it requires
service. Assuming that the Client requires
service from Server Sv (1 ~ v ~ q), then the
Client must employ the selector R e ,8v'
This authenticator Ae,m, the received session
public key Ke,m, the enciphered service ticket
Ce,m and the selector R e,8v must then be presen ted to the Server Sv'

The action of choosing an element x randomly
and uniformly from set S is denoted by XERS. Gis
a cryptographically strong pseudo-random string
generator based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in finite fields [9]. G stretches
an n-bit input string into an output string whose
length can be an arbitrary polynomial in n. This
generator produces O(log n) bits output at each

On first being presented with the (enciphered)
service ticket, the Server Sv must compute its
corresponding decrypt or

Dm,e == (Yt g8 Ke,m)x Sv
6

exponentiation. All messages to be encrypted are
chosen from the set ~P(n), where pen) is an arbitrary polynomial with P( n) 2: n and where
padding can be used for messages of length less
than n bits. The polynomial i = i( n) specifies
the length of tags. The function h is a one-way
hash function compressing input strings into i-bit
output strings. In the remainder of this paper all
exponentiations are assumed to be done over the
underlying groups. The reader is directed to [9]
for a comprehensive discussion on the constructs
of the family of cryptosystems.

5.2

(p, g, Ae,tgs, Ke,tgs, Ge,tgs, Dtgs,e) and receives the
output Te,tgs.

Algorithm 2 Decipher(p,g, A, K, G, D)
1. r' = AD.
2. z' = G( r')[l ...(P(n)+l(n))].
3. m=z'tBG.

4. T' = m[l ...P(n)].
5. t' = m[(P(n)-!;1) ...(P(n)H(n))].
6. if h(T' tB r') '= t' then
output (T')
else
output (0).

Getting initial and service tickets

In the process of getting an initial ticket the
Clients asks the KDC to prepare the ticket to be
submitted by the Client to the TGS. The KDC
first performs k e,tgsER[1,p-1] followed by the calculation Ke,tgs == gkc,tgs. The KDC then enciphers
the ticket Te,tgs using the key re,tgs by invoking
Encipher (Algorithm 1) with the input parameters
(p, g, r e,tgs, Te,tgs) resulting in the output Ce,tgs.

end

The same procedure is followed by the TGS
in enciphering the ticket to be submitted by the
Client to the Server. The minor difference in this
case is that the TGS appends a response key ke,s
(ie. the secret half of the session key) to the ticket
Te,s. This addition does not affect the algorithms
and their security in any way. Hence, the TGS invokes Encipher (Algorithm 1) with the input parameters (p, g, re,s, (Te,sllke,s» resulting in the output Gc,s. The Server deciphers Ge,s into (Te,sllke,s)
using Decipher (Algorithm 2) with input values
(p,g, Ae,s, Ke,s, Ge,s, Ds,e).

Algorithm 1 Encipher(p,g, r, T)
1. z = G(r)[l ... (P(n)H(n))].
2. t = h(T tB r).
3. m = (Tilt).
4. G = z tB m.
5. output (G).

6

end

Hierarchical inter-realm authentication

The integration of security into distributed systems has introduced the need to manage the information pertaining to the security functions in
the distributed system. The most common and
important need is that of providing a method to
manage cryptographic keys of the components in
the distributed system. One approach that may
be adopted is that of organizing the components
into a hierarchy consisting of a number of domains

The KDC then sends the resulting ciphertext
Ge,tgs and the session public key Ke,tgs to the
Client who proceeds to compute Ae,tgs. These
values are then submitted by the Client to the
TGS who tries to decipher Ce,tgs. This is done
by the TGS first computing Dtgs,e and using
it and the received values as input to Decipher (Algorithm 2). That is, the TGS inputs

7

or realms, each being managed by an independent
trusted authority (eg. TGS). This approach has
the advantage of the localized distribution of new
keys, hence reducing the replication of keys across
the entire distributed system.

requires the service provided by a Server which is
located within the realm of TGS C. In this case
the TGS A must enroll the aid of its parent TGS
B to forward the Client's request to TGS node C.
Two general arrangements of the keys of the nodes
in the hierarchy will be considered in the following. Note that the terms "TGS" and "node" will
be used interchangeably to simplify discussion. In
our example, we assume that the TGSs A, Band
C have the key pairs (X tgsa , Ytgsa), (Xtgsb, Ytgsb)
and (Xtgsc , Ytgsc) respectively.

Within the context of our discussion a domain
or realm can consist of Clients, Servers, a local
managing TGS and of other TGSs that manage
their own realms. In this manner, the components are organized into a hierarchy based on the
TGSs, with each TGS managing a certain number of Clients, Servers and other TGSs. A Client
within a realm may request service from a Server
in the same domain in the manner previously discussed. However, it is also natural for a Client to
request service from a "foreign" Server which is
located in a different realm on another part of the
hierarchy. In this section we address inter-realm
authentication together with some accompanying
issues. Our approach is general enough to be applicable to a number of areas, one being the X.500
Directory Services [13].

6.1

One possible arrangement of keys in the hierarchy
is based on their maintenance on a per realm basis.
That is, in this arrangement a TGS node holds
the public key of only its parent node and all its
children nodes. This arrangement is similar to the
arrangement of directories in [14]. Using Figure 2
as an example, TGS node B has the public key of
its parent and of TGS nodes A and C. However,
B does not have the public keys of the descendants
of TGS nodes A and C. In this situation the TGS
node A must refer the Client to node A's parent,
namely node B. The node B, not knowing the
public key of the Server must then refer the Client
to B's child node C. Since node C is the trusted
authority of the realm in which the Server resides,
node C knows the public key of the Server and
thus can forward the Client's request to the Server.
These steps are shown in the following (Figure 3).
Note that in essence, the Client must interact with
every TGS node between its own TGS node (A)
and the common ancestor node (B), and between
the common ancestor node and the destination's
TGS node (C). The deeper the Client is located in
the hierarchy from the common ancestor, the more
interactions it has to perform in order to reach the
destination.
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Figure 2: A hierarchy of TGSs
In our usage, a hierarchy is assumed to be a
directed acyclic graph and each node in the hierarchy is assumed to have only one parent node. An
example of such a hierarchy that will be used in the
following discussions is given in Figure 2. In Figure 2 the Client is located in the domain or realm
under the jurisdiction of the TGS A. The Client

1. Client

2. KDC

--t

4. TGS A
8

Client: Kc,tgsa, Cc,tgsa

--t

3. Client

KDC: c, tgsa

--t

TGS A: Ac,tgsa, Kc,tgsa, Cc,tgsa,

--t

Client: Kc,tgsb, Cc,tgsb

S

5. Client

-+

6. TGS B
7. Client

-+
-+

8. TGS G

the steps used in our approach can be modified in
a straight-forward manner to suit cases in which
a node has a copy of the public key of every other
node in the hierarchy.

TGS B: Ac,tgsb, Kc,tgsb, Gc,tgsb, s
Client: Kc,tgsc, Gc,tgsc

TGS G: Ac,tgsc, Kc,tgsc, Gc,tgsc,

S

Returning to our scenario where a Client requires the services offered by a foreign Server, the
TGS in the Client's realm has more flexibility in
issuing the enciphered ticket. Hence, with a TGS
node knowing the public keys of all its ancestors,
the node can find a common ancestor between itself and the TGS who manages the realm in which
the Server resides. Looking back at Figure 2, the
TGS node A (managing the Client's realm) and
the TGS node G (managing the Server's realm)
have a common ancestor (parent) in the TGS node

Client: Kc,s, Gc,s

-+

9. Client -+ Server: Ac,s, Kc,s, Gc,s

10. Server

-+

Client: {timestamp + l}r S,c
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In this case, the TGS node A must prepare the
enciphered ticket to be decipherable by the common ancestor (node B). This common ancestor
node B must then locate the desired Server and
re-encipher the ticket in such a way that it is decipherable by the Server with the necessary approval
of the TGS within the Server's realm. That is, the
ticket must be decipherable by the Server with the
approval of the TGS node G in the form of node
G sending a decrypt or for the ticket to the Server.
Note that only TGS A and G are involved with
the common ancestor B, event hough both TGSs
A and G may have many other ancestors between
them and TGS B respectively. Hence, in such a
globalized key approach only a maximum of three
TGSs (A, B and G) are invoked independent of
the depth of the two TGS nodes (A and G) from
their common ancestor (B). This scenario is expressed in the following steps (Figure 4).
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Figure 3: Authentication with localized keys

6.2

Globalized keys

Another possible arrangement of keys in the hierarchy is a more globalized one, in which a node
knows not only the public key of all its descendant
nodes, but also the public key of all its ancestor
nodes (bearing in mind that a node only has one
parent). Here a node does not have the public keys
of any of its sibling nodes nor that of their descendants. Although such a configuration is costly in
terms of the number of messages to be delivered
when a node generates a new public key, the gains
occur during the interaction with nodes located in
other realms. Note that in our approach the public
keys are not distributed in a fully globalized manner. That is, since a node does not have the public
keys of its siblings, it must request the aid of its
parent when dealing with such siblings. However,

1. Client

2. KDC

-+

Client: Kc,tgsa, Gc,tgsa

-+

3. Client

-+

4. TGS A
Here

KDC: c,tgsa

TGS A: Ac,tgsa, Kc,tgsa, Gc,tgsa,

-+

TGS B: Kc,tgsb, Gc,tgsb
Gc,tgsb

==

{Tc,tgsb}r C, t g8 b

where
T c,tgs b

9

=
- (y c v.I tg8 b)Xtgsa+kc,tgSb

S

5. TGS

A ~

6. Client

~

Client:

TGS

Kc,tgsb

B: Ac,tgsa

,'.(

I

I

I

where

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

::

B
","''''--,-.-.~--:'''~ ,

::
7. TGS

B ~

TGS

::

C: Kc,tgscs, Cc,tgscs

I

t

I

I

,

\

Ac,tgsa Dtgsb,tgsa
Cc,tgsb

into

7

Client:

Kc,tgscs

where
D tgsc,tgsb =
- (l;,r
K c,tgscs )xlgSC
~ tgsb

Server:

Ac,tgsb

where

and recreates the key

in

order

==

~

,C

"""
"

,,'

_______ . . ___ _

...... :: . . . . . . . -io

---

... ' --- ____________________ V----Client
Server

Discussion

With specific reference to Kerberos, our approach also differs in the way the Client's authenticators are used. In [3, 5] the authenticator is
used to convince the trusted authority (ie. TGS
or Server) that the Client holds the same copy of
the session key being shared between them. The
authenticator here consists of a piece of text con-

Ac,tgsb Dtgsc,tgsb D s,tgsb

to

decipher

Cc,tgscs

into

{Tc,tgscsllkc,tgscs}

11. Server

\

In contrast, in our approach less trust is required of the authority since the compromise of
such an authority (ie. KDC and/or TGS) only reveals to the attacker the public keys of the Clients.
Hence, the attacker cannot masquerade as the
Client nor as a trusted authority.

The Server then computes

r~,t9SCS

I,'
,

One fundamental difference between our approach
and that of Kerberos [3, 5] lies in the underlying
usage of the cryptosystem. In Kerberos and other
authentication systems based on private (shared)
key cryptography, the Clients must share a common key with the trusted authority, such as the
KDC or the TGS. This necessitates a high level of
security in the implementation of the trusted authority since their compromise immediately leads
to the compromise of the Client's key or of the keys
belonging to other trusted authorities. This further leads to the possible masquerade of the Client
and/or the trusted authorities by the attacker [10].
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taining the timestamp from the ticket. In our
approach the process is less explicit in the sense
that the authenticator (decryptor or selector) is
a parameter that is required by the trusted authority to decipher the ticket. If an attacker removes, modifies or substitutes the authenticator,
the trusted authority (ie. TGS and Server) will
not be able to decipher the ticket, leading it to
reject the Client's request. Since only the Client
has the secret key to create the authenticator, the
successful decipherment of the ticket indicates to
the trusted authority that the Client has behaved
accordingly and no active attacks have occurred.
Note that if conditions require more explicit acknowledgment by the Client, the authenticator
can be submitted together with the Clients name,
address and ticket timestamp through a separate
secure channel (eg. a separate instance of the cryptosystem).

nodes cannot use it to create combination of keys
in the manner of Equation (1).
This apparent difficulty to combine keys in the
RSA stems from the fact that exponentiation in
RSA is applied to the message. In the cryptosystern of [9] exponentiation is done on the generator
g, independent of the message to be enciphered.

8

Security achieved

One of the primary motivating reasons for employing the cryptosystem of [9] is its strength against
chosen ciphertext attacks [15]. In such an attack
the attacker has access to the deciphering algorithm and can feed the algorithm with any input ciphertext in order to obtain its corresponding
original plaintext. From these matching instances
the attacker can then obtain information to finally
cryptanalyze and break a given ciphertext.

An important point worth noting concerns the
method of encipherment of the cryptosystem of [9]
in contrast to the RSA cryptosystem [8]. In the
cryptosystem of [9] all the principals (ie. Clients,
KDC, TGSs and Servers) share the same parameters 9 and p. This leads to the easy formation of keys (Equation (1)), authenticators (Equation (2)), decryptors (Equation (3)) and selectors.
From the practical point of view this compares
favourably with the RSA cryptosystem in which
every principal must accompany its public key
with its individual modulus N.

The cryptosystem is promising because it has
been show in [9] to be secure, not only against chosen ciphertext attacks, but further against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks. In this type of
attacks the attacker is permitted to select the input ciphertext which are correlated to the target
ciphertext. Hence, the attacker continues to have
access to the enciphering algorithm even after the
attacker has the target ciphertext. Clearly, the attacker is not permitted to feed the target ciphertext into the deciphering algorithm.

In the case of the RSA cryptosystem, the sharing of the modulus N does not lead to the possible combination of keys belonging to two different principals. More specifically, assume in RSA
that P and Q are (secret) primes whose product
is N, and that ¢(N) = lcm(P - 1,Q - 1). The
secret and public keys (k,K) in RSA must satisfy k K == 1 mod ¢(N). The encipherment of a
plaintext M is done as Mk mod N, while the resulting ciphertext can be deciphered by applying
the public key K in the same exponentiation manner. Here note that both P and Q are secret to
the owner of the keys, and hence ¢(N) must also
be secret. This means that the ¢(N) of one node
cannot be shared with other nodes, and thus other

In our mode of usage of the cryptosystem,
the weakest point in the scheme is equivalent to
solving instances of the discrete logarithm problem [16]. More specifically, in attempting to obtain
any secret key that participated in the creation of
an authenticator, a descriptor or a selector the attacker is faced with solving a discrete logarithm
problem. In attempting to obtain the plaintext
ticket from any given ciphertext, the attacker must
break the cryptosystem.
11
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Conclusion
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In this paper we have attempted to argue and illustrate that Kerberos-type authentication protocols
have more to offer when they are founded upon
public key cryptosystems. A protocol has been
presented that implements the Kerberos authentication service [3, 4, 5] using the recent public
key cryptosystem of [9], which has been shown to
be secure against the adaptatively chosen ciphertext attacks. This protocol has also been extended
to allow multiple services to be obtained by using the one same ticket. Another extension relating to hierarchical inter-realm authentication has
been illustrated by way of two protocols based on
the localized and globalized arrangement of keys.
Public key cryptography provides the advantage
of one-to-one secure and authentic communications between entities in the system, something
which is not immediately available to approaches
based on private key cryptography. Our selection
of the cryptosystem of [9] is motivated not only
by its high level of security, but also by the ease
at which session key compositions can be created.
The use of public key cryptography also has the
advantage in that the trusted authorities can be
implemented with less trust since they only maintain the publicly-known keys [10]. The protocols
in the current work represents a step towards solutions based on the mixture of private key and
public key cryptography (such as in [17]), combining the advantages of both philosophies.
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